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Remote State Estimation over Packet Dropping
Links in the Presence of an Eavesdropper
Alex S. Leong, Daniel E. Quevedo, Daniel Dolz, and Subhrakanti Dey
Abstract—This paper studies remote state estimation in the
presence of an eavesdropper. A sensor transmits local state esti-
mates over a packet dropping link to a remote estimator, while an
eavesdropper can successfully overhear each sensor transmission
with a certain probability. The objective is to determine when
the sensor should transmit, in order to minimize the estimation
error covariance at the remote estimator, while trying to keep
the eavesdropper error covariance above a certain level. This
is done by solving an optimization problem that minimizes a
linear combination of the expected estimation error covariance
and the negative of the expected eavesdropper error covariance.
Structural results on the optimal transmission policy are derived,
and shown to exhibit thresholding behaviour in the estimation
error covariances. In the infinite horizon situation, it is shown
that with unstable systems one can keep the expected estimation
error covariance bounded while the expected eavesdropper er-
ror covariance becomes unbounded. An alternative measure of
security, constraining the amount of information revealed to the
eavesdropper, is also considered, and similar structural results
on the optimal transmission policy are derived. In the infinite
horizon situation with unstable systems, it is now shown that
for any transmission policy which keeps the expected estimation
error covariance bounded, the expected amount of information
revealed to the eavesdropper is always lower bounded away
from zero. An extension of our results to the transmission of
measurements is also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ever increasing amounts of data being transmitted
wirelessly, the need to protect systems from malicious agents
has become increasingly important. Traditionally, information
security has been studied in the context of cryptography. How-
ever, due to the often limited computational power available at
the transmitters (e.g. sensors in wireless sensor networks) to
implement strong encryption, as well as the increased compu-
tational power available to malicious agents, achieving security
using solely cryptographic methods may not be sufficient.
Thus, alternative ways to implement security using information
theoretic and physical layer techniques, complementary to the
traditional cryptographic approaches, have attracted significant
recent interest [1].
In communications theory, the notion of information theo-
retic security has been around for many years, in fact dating
back to the work of Claude Shannon in the 1940s [2]. Roughly
speaking, a communication system is regarded as secure in
the information theoretic sense if the mutual information
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between the original message and what is received at the
eavesdropper is either zero or becomes vanishingly small as
the block length of the codewords increases [3]. The term
“physical layer security” has been used to describe ways
to implement information theoretic security using physical
layer characteristics of the wireless channel such as fading,
interference, and noise, see e.g. [4]–[7].
Motivated in part by the ideas of physical layer security, the
consideration of security issues in signal processing systems
has also started to gain the attention of researchers. For a
survey on works in detection and estimation in the presence
of eavesdroppers, focusing particularly on detection, see [8].
In estimation problems with eavesdroppers, studies include
[9]–[12]. The objective is to minimize the average mean
squared error at the legitimate receiver, while trying to keep
the mean squared error at the eavesdropper above a certain
level, by using techniques such as stochastic bit flipping
[9], transmit filter design [10], and power control [11], [12].
The above works deal with estimation of either constants or
i.i.d. sources. In contrast, the focus of the current paper is
to consider the more general, and more difficult, problem
of state estimation of dynamical systems when there is an
eavesdropper. For unstable systems, it has recently been shown
that when using uncertain wiretap channels, one can keep the
estimation error of the legitimate receiver bounded while the
estimation error of the eavesdropper becomes unbounded for
sufficiently large coding block length [13]. In the current work
we are interested primarily in estimation performance, and as
such we do not assume coding, which can introduce large
delays. Nonetheless, as we shall show, similar behaviour to
[13] can also be derived for our setup in the infinite horizon
case. In a similar setup to the current work, but transmitting
measurements and without using feedback acknowledgements,
[14] derived mechanisms for keeping the expected error co-
variance bounded while driving the expected eavesdropper
covariance unbounded, provided the reception probability is
greater than the eavesdropping probability. By allowing for
feedback, in this work we show that the same behaviour can
be achieved for all eavesdropping probabilities strictly less
than one.
In information security, the two main types of attacks are
generally regarded as: 1) passive attacks from eavesdroppers,
and 2) active attacks such as Byzantine attacks or Denial of
Service attacks. This paper is concerned with passive attacks
from eavesdroppers. However, estimation and control prob-
lems in the presence of active attacks have also been studied.
Works in this area include [15]–[21], just to mention a few.
Another related area deals with privacy issues in estimation
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and control, see [22], [23] and the references therein.
In this paper, a sensor makes noisy measurements of a linear
dynamical process. The sensor transmits local state estimates
to the remote estimator over a packet dropping link. At the
same time, an eavesdropper can successfully eavesdrop on
the sensor transmission with a certain probability, see Fig.
1. Within this setup, we consider the problem of dynamic
transmission scheduling, i.e. deciding at each instant whether
the sensor should transmit. We seek to minimize a linear
combination of the expected error covariance at the remote
estimator and the negative of the expected error covariance
at the eavesdropper. This scheduling is done at the remote
estimator.
Summary of contributions: The main contributions of this
paper are:
• Structural results on the optimal transmission policy are
derived. In the case where knowledge of the eaves-
dropper’s error covariances are available at the remote
estimator, our results show that 1) for a fixed value of the
eavesdropper’s error covariance, the optimal policy has
a threshold structure: the sensor should transmit if and
only if the remote estimator’s error covariance exceeds
a certain threshold, and 2) for a fixed value of the
remote estimator’s error covariance, the sensor should not
transmit if and only if the eavesdropper’s error covariance
is above a certain threshold. Such threshold policies are
similar to schemes considered in event triggered estima-
tion, e.g. [24]–[27]. In the case where knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s error covariances are unavailable at the
remote estimator, for a fixed belief of the eavesdropper’s
error covariance, the sensor should transmit if and only if
the remote estimator’s error covariance exceeds a certain
threshold.
• For unstable systems, it is shown that in the infinite hori-
zon situation there exist transmission policies which can
keep the expected estimation error covariance bounded
while the expected eavesdropper error covariance is un-
bounded. This behaviour can be achieved for all eaves-
dropping probabilities strictly less than one.
• An alternative measure of security, constraining the
amount of information revealed to the eavesdropper (mea-
sured via the sum of conditional mutual informations),
is also considered, and similar structural results on the
optimal transmission policy are derived.
• For this alternative measure of security, in the infinite
horizon situation with unstable systems, it is now shown
that for any transmission policy which keeps the ex-
pected estimation error covariance bounded, the expected
amount of information revealed to the eavesdropper is
always lower bounded away from zero.
• An extension to the transmission of measurements is
described, where it is shown that threshold-type be-
haviour in the optimal transmission policy holds for scalar
systems, but not in general for vector systems.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
system model. Section III considers the case where knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s error covariances is available at the
remote estimator, while Section IV studies the case where this
information is unavailable. Section V considers an alternative
measure of security which tries to minimize the estimator
error covariance while constraining the amount of informa-
tion revealed to the eavesdropper. Section VI considers the
transmission of measurements. Numerical studies are given in
Section VII. Section VIII draws conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A diagram of the system model is shown in Fig. 1. Consider
a discrete time process
xk+1 = Axk + wk (1)
where xk ∈ Rnx and wk is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and
covariance Q > 0.1 The sensor has measurements
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
where yk ∈ Rny and vk is Gaussian with zero mean and
covariance R > 0. The noise processes {wk} and {vk} are
assumed to be mutually independent.
The sensor transmits quantities y¯k to the remote estimator.
Common choices for y¯k are the measurements, i.e. y¯k = yk, or
the local state estimates y¯k = xˆsk|k [28]. We first treat the case
where the local state estimates are transmitted, see Section VI
for the case where measurements are transmitted. This requires
the sensor to have some computational capabilities (i.e. the
sensor is “smart”) to run a local Kalman filter. The local state
estimates and error covariances
xˆsk|k−1 , E[xk|y0, . . . , yk−1], xˆ
s
k|k , E[xk|y0, . . . , yk]
P sk|k−1 , E[(xk − xˆ
s
k|k−1)(xk − xˆ
s
k|k−1)
T |y0, . . . , yk−1]
P sk|k , E[(xk − xˆ
s
k|k)(xk − xˆ
s
k|k)
T |y0, . . . , yk]
can be computed at the sensor using the standard Kalman
filtering equations, see e.g. [29]. We will assume that the pair
(A,C) is detectable and the pair (A,Q1/2) is stabilizable.
Let P¯+ be the steady state value of P sk|k−1, and P¯ be the
steady state value of P sk|k as k → ∞, which both exist due
to the detectability assumption. To simplify the presentation,
we will assume that this local Kalman filter is operating in the
steady state regime, so that P sk|k = P¯ , ∀k. In general, the local
1For a symmetric matrix X , we say that X > 0 if it is positive definite,
and X ≥ 0 if it is positive semi-definite.
3Kalman filter will converge to steady state at an exponential
rate [29].
Let νk ∈ {0, 1} be decision variables such that νk = 1 if
and only if xˆsk|k is to be transmitted at time k. The decision
variables νk are determined at the remote estimator, which
is assumed to have more computational capabilities than the
sensor, using information available at time k−1, and then fed
back to the sensor before transmission at time k.
At time instances when νk = 1, the sensor transmits its
local state estimate xˆsk|k over a packet dropping channel to
the remote estimator. Let γk be random variables such that
γk = 1 if the sensor transmission at time k is successfully
received by the remote estimator, and γk = 0 otherwise. We
will assume that {γk} is i.i.d. Bernoulli [30] with
P(γk = 1) = λ ∈ (0, 1).
The sensor transmissions can be overheard by an eavesdrop-
per over another packet dropping channel. Let γe,k be random
variables such that γe,k = 1 if the sensor transmission at time
k is overheard by the eavesdropper, and γe,k = 0 otherwise.
We will assume that {γe,k} is i.i.d. Bernoulli with
P(γe,k = 1) = λe ∈ (0, 1).
The processes {γk} and {γe,k} are assumed to be mutually
independent.
At instances where νk = 1, it is assumed that the remote
estimator knows whether the transmission was successful or
not, i.e., the remote estimator knows the value γk, with
dropped packets discarded. Define
Ik ,{ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γ0, . . . , νkγk, ν0γ0xˆ
s
0|0, . . . , νkγkxˆ
s
k|k}
as the information set available to the remote estimator at
time k. Denote the state estimates and error covariances at
the remote estimator by:
xˆk|k−1 , E[xk|Ik−1], xˆk|k , E[xk|Ik],
Pk|k−1 , E[(xk − xˆk|k−1)(xk − xˆk|k−1)
T |Ik−1],
Pk|k , E[(xk − xˆk|k)(xk − xˆk|k)
T |Ik].
(3)
Similarly, the eavesdropper knows if it has eavesdropped
sucessfully. Define
Ie,k ,{ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γe,0, . . . , νkγe,k,
ν0γe,0xˆ
s
0|0, . . . , νkγe,kxˆ
s
k|k}
as the information set available to the eavesdropper at time k,
and the state estimates and error covariances at the eavesdrop-
per by2:
xˆe,k|k−1 , E[xk|Ie,k−1], xˆe,k|k , E[xk|Ie,k],
Pe,k|k−1 , E[(xk − xˆe,k|k−1)(xk − xˆk|e,k−1)
T |Ie,k−1],
Pe,k|k , E[(xk − xˆe,k|k)(xk − xˆe,k|k)
T |Ie,k].
For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that the initial
covariances P0|0 = P¯ and Pe,0|0 = P¯ .
2We will assume that the eavesdropper knows the system parameters
A,C,Q,R. If these are unknown, then the performance at the eavesdropper
will be worse than the derived results.
As stated before, the decision variables νk are determined at
the remote estimator and fed back to the sensor. In Section III
we consider the case where νk depends on both Pk−1|k−1 and
Pe,k−1|k−1, while in Section IV we consider the case where νk
depends only on Pk−1|k−1 and the remote estimator’s belief
of Pe,k−1|k−1 constructed from knowledge of previous νk’s.
In either case, the decisions do not depend on the state xk (or
the noisy measurement yk). Thus, the optimal remote estimator
can be shown to have the form
xˆk|k =
{
Axˆk−1|k−1 , νkγk = 0
xˆsk|k , νkγk = 1
Pk|k =
{
f(Pk−1|k−1) , νkγk = 0
P¯ , νkγk = 1
(4)
where
f(X) , AXAT +Q, (5)
while at the eavesdropper the optimal estimator has the form
xˆe,k|k =
{
Axˆe,k−1|k−1 , νkγe,k = 0
xˆsk|k , νkγe,k = 1
Pe,k|k =
{
f(Pe,k−1|k−1) , νkγe,k = 0
P¯ , νkγe,k = 1
Define the countable set of matrices:
S , {P¯ , f(P¯ ), f2(P¯ ), . . . }, (6)
where fn(.) is the n-fold composition of f(.), with the
convention that f0(X) = X . The set S consists of all possible
values of Pk|k at the remote estimator, as well as all possible
values of Pe,k|k at the eavesdropper. Given two symmetric
matrices X and Y , we say that X ≤ Y if Y −X is positive
semi-definite, and X < Y if Y − X is positive definite. As
shown in e.g. [31], there is a total ordering on the elements
of S given by
P¯ ≤ f(P¯ ) ≤ f2(P¯ ) ≤ ...
III. EAVESDROPPER ERROR COVARIANCE KNOWN AT
REMOTE ESTIMATOR
In this section we consider the case where the transmission
decisions νk can depend on the error covariances of both the
remote estimator Pk−1|k−1 and the eavesdropper Pe,k−1|k−1.
While knowledge of Pe,k−1|k−1 at the remote estimator may
be difficult to achieve in practice, this case nevertheless
serves as a useful benchmark on the achievable performance.
The situation where Pe,k−1|k−1 is not known at the remote
estimator will be considered in Section IV.
We will first formulate an optimal transmission scheduling
problem that minimizes a linear combination of the expected
estimation error covariance and the negative of the expected
eavesdropper error covariance. We then prove some structural
results on the associated optimal transmission schedules. Fi-
nally, we consider the infinite horizon situation.
4A. Optimal Transmission Scheduling
The approach to security taken in Sections III-IV of this pa-
per is to minimize the expected error covariance at the remote
estimator, while trying to keep the expected error covariance at
the eavesdropper above a certain level.3 To accomplish this, we
will formulate a problem that minimizes a linear combination
of the expected estimation error covariance and the negative
of the expected eavesdropper error covariance. The problem
we wish to solve is the finite horizon (of horizon K) problem:
min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E[βtrPk|k − (1− β)trPe,k|k]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
E[βtrPk|k − (1 − β)trPe,k|k
|P0,0, Pe,0|0, Ik−1, Ie,k−1, νk]
]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
E[βtrPk|k − (1 − β)trPe,k|k
|Pk−1,k−1, Pe,k−1,k−1, νk]
]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯ + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
− (1 − β)(νkλetrP¯ + (1− νkλe)trf(Pe,k−1|k−1))
]
,
(7)
for some β ∈ (0, 1). The design parameter β in problem
(7) controls the tradeoff between estimation performance at
the remote estimator and at the eavesdropper, with a larger
β placing more importance on keeping E[Pk|k] small, and a
smaller β placing more importance on keeping E[Pe,k|k] large.
The second equality in (7) holds since Pk−1|k−1 (similarly for
Pe,k−1|k−1) is a deterministic function of P0|0 and Ik−1, and
Pk|k is a function of Pk−1|k−1, νk, and γk. The third equality
in (7) follows from computing the conditional expectations
E[Pk|k|Pk−1|k−1, νk] and E[Pe,k|k |Pe.k−1|k−1, νk].
Problem (7) can be solved numerically using dynamic
programming. For that purpose, define the functions Jk(·, ·) :
S × S → R recursively as:
JK+1(P, Pe) = 0
Jk(P, Pe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trf(P ))
− (1− β)(νλetrP¯ + (1− νλe)trf(Pe))
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ ν(1− λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), P¯ )
+
(
ν(1− λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν
)
Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
}
(8)
for k = K, . . . , 1. Then problem (7) is solved by computing
Jk(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) for k = K,K − 1, . . . , 1.
Remark III.1. Note that problem (20) can be solved ex-
actly since, for any horizon K , the possible values of
3Similar notions have been used in [9]–[12], which studied the estimation
of constant parameters or i.i.d sources in the presence of an eavesdropper.
(Pk|k, Pe,k|k) will lie in the finite set {P¯ , f(P¯ ), . . . , fK(P¯ )}×
{P¯ , f(P¯ ), . . . , fK(P¯ )}, which has finite cardinality (K+1)2.
B. Structural Properties of Optimal Transmission Schedules
In this subsection we will prove some structural properties
on the optimal solution to problem (20). In particular, we
will show that 1) for a fixed Pe,k−1|k−1, the optimal policy
is to only transmit if Pk−1|k−1 exceeds a threshold (which
in general depends on k on Pe,k−1|k−1), and 2) for a fixed
Pk−1|k−1, the optimal policy is to transmit if and only if
Pe,k−1|k−1 is below a threshold (which depends on k and
Pk−1|k−1). Knowing that the optimal policies are of threshold-
type gives insight into the form of the optimal solution, with
characteristics of event triggered estimation, and can also
provide computational savings when solving problem (20)
numerically, see [32].
Definition III.1. A function F (.) : S → R is increasing if
X ≤ Y ⇒ F (X) ≤ F (Y ).
Lemma III.2. For any n ∈ N, trfn(P ) is an increasing
function of P .
Proof: We have
trfn(P ) = tr
(
AnP (An)T +
n−1∑
m=0
AmQ(Am)T
)
which is increasing with P .
From the definition of Jk(., .) in (8), we know that if the
minimizer ν∗ = 0 then
Jk(P, Pe) = βtrf(P )− (1− β)trf(Pe) +Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe)),
(9)
and if the minimizer ν∗ = 1 then
Jk(P, Pe) = β(λtrP¯ + (1− λ)trf(P ))
− (1− β)(λetrP¯ + (1− λe)trf(Pe))
+ λλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + λ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ (1− λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), P¯ )
+ (1− λ)(1 − λe)Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe)). (10)
Denote the difference of (9) and (10) as
φk(P, Pe) , βλtrf(P )− βλtrP¯
− (1− β)λetrf(Pe) + (1− β)λetrP¯
+ [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
− λλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ )− λ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
− (1− λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), P¯ ) (11)
Note that when ν∗k = 1, i.e. the optimal decision at time k
is to transmit, we have φk(P, Pe) > 0. The following result
proves some structural properties of the optimal solution. Part
(i) shows that for fixed Pe,k−1|k−1, the optimal policy is to
transmit if and only if Pk−1|k−1 exceeds a threshold. Part (ii)
shows that for fixed Pk−1|k−1, the optimal policy is to not
transmit if and only if Pe,k−1|k−1 is above a threshold.
5Theorem III.3. (i) For fixed Pe,k−1|k−1, the optimal solution
to problem (7) is a threshold policy on Pk−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk−1|k−1 ≤ P ∗k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗k ∈ S depends on k and Pe,k−1|k−1.
(ii) For fixed Pk−1|k−1, the optimal solution to problem (7) is
a threshold policy on Pe,k−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pe,k−1|k−1 ≥ P ∗e,k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗e,k ∈ S depends on k and Pk−1|k−1.
Proof: (i) Since νk only takes on the two values 0 and
1, Theorem III.3(i) will be proved if we can show that the
functions φk(P, Pe) defined in (11) are increasing functions
of P for k = 1, . . . ,K . As trf(P ) is an increasing function
of P by Lemma III.2, it is sufficient to show that
[1− (1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(f(P ), f(Pe))− (1−λ)λeJk(f(P ), P¯ )
is an increasing function of P for all k. We will prove this
using induction. In order to make the induction argument work,
we will prove the slightly more general statement that
[1− (1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(f
n(P ), Pe)− (1−λ)λeJk(f
n(P ), P ′e)
is an increasing function of P for all k, all n ∈ N and all
Pe, P
′
e ∈ S.
The case of k = K + 1 is clear. Now assume that, for
P ≥ P ′,
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jl(f
n(P ), Pe)−(1−λ)λeJl(f
n(P ), P ′e)
−[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jl(f
n(P ′),Pe)+(1−λ)λeJl(f
n(P ′),P ′e)
≥ 0
(12)
holds for l = K + 1,K, . . . , k + 1. Then
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(f
n(P ), Pe)−(1−λ)λeJk(f
n(P ), P ′e)
−[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(f
n(P ′),Pe)+(1−λ)λeJk(f
n(P ′),P ′e)
≥ min
ν∈{0,1}
{
[1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
{
β[νλtrP¯ + (1 − νλ)
× trfn+1(P )]− (1− β)[νλetrP¯ + (1 − νλe)trf(Pe)]
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ), f(Pe))
}
− (1 − λ)λe
{
β[νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trfn+1(P )]
− (1 − β)[νλetrP¯ + (1− νλe)trf(P ′e)]
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(P
′
e))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ), f(P ′e))
}
− [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
{
β[νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trfn+1(P ′)]
− (1 − β)[νλetrP¯ + (1− νλe)trf(Pe)]
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ′), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ′), f(Pe))
}
+ (1− λ)λe
{
β[νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trfn+1(P ′)]
− (1 − β)[νλetrP¯ + (1− νλe)trf(P ′e)]
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(P
′
e))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ′), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ′), f(P ′e))
}}
= min
ν∈{0,1}
{
[1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
{
β(1 − νλ)trfn+1(P )
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ), f(Pe))
}
− (1− λ)λe
{
β(1− νλ)trfn+1(P )
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ), f(P ′e))
}
− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
{
β(1 − νλ)trfn+1(P ′)
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ′), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ′), f(Pe))
}
+ (1− λ)λe
{
β(1− νλ)trfn+1(P ′)
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f
n+1(P ′), P¯ )
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(f
n+1(P ′), f(P ′e))
}
≥ 0
where the last inequality holds (for both cases ν∗ = 0 and
ν∗ = 1) by Lemma III.2 and the induction hypothesis (12).
(ii) As −trf(Pe) is a decreasing function of Pe, it is now
sufficient to show that
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(f(P ), f(Pe))−λ(1−λe)Jk(P¯ , f(Pe))
is a decreasing function of Pe for all k: Using similar tech-
niques as in the proof of part (i), we can prove by induction
the slightly more general statement that
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(P, f
n(Pe))−λ(1−λe)Jk(P
′, fn(Pe))
is a decreasing function of Pe for all k, all n ∈ N and all
P, P ′ ∈ S. The details are omitted for brevity.
C. Infinite Horizon
We now consider the infinite horizon situation. Let us first
give a condition on when E[Pk|k] will be bounded. If A is
stable, this is always the case. In the case where A is unstable,
consider the policy with νk = 1, ∀k, which transmits at every
time instant, and is similar to the situation where local state
estimates are transmitted over packet dropping links [28], [33].
From the results of [28] and [33] we have that E[Pk|k] is
bounded if and only if
λ > 1−
1
|σmax(A)|2
, (13)
6where |σmax(A)| is the largest magnitude of the eigenvalues
of A (i.e. the spectral radius of A). Thus condition (13) will
ensure the existence of policies which keep E[Pk|k] bounded.
We will now show that for unstable systems, in the infinite
horizon situation, there exists transmission policies which
can make the expected eavesdropper error covariance un-
bounded while keeping the expected estimator error covari-
ance bounded. This can be achieved for all probabilities of
successful eavesdropping λe strictly less than one.
Theorem III.4. Suppose that A is unstable, and that
λ > 1 − 1|σmax(A)|2 . Then for any λe < 1, there ex-
ist transmission policies in the infinite horizon situation
such that lim supK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] is bounded and
lim infK→∞
1
K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pe,k|k] is unbounded.
Proof: The proof is by construction of a policy with
the required properties. Consider the threshold policy which
transmits at time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P¯ ) for some
t ∈ N. Since λ > 1 − 1|σmax(A)|2 , one can show using results
from Section IV-C of [31] that limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] <
∞ for any t ∈ N.
Now choose a horizon K > t. Consider the event ω where
each transmission is successfully received at the remote esti-
mator, and unsuccessfully received by the eavesdropper. Using
an argument similar to [34], we will show that the contribution
of this event ω will already cause the expected eavesdropper
covariance to become unbounded. Under this event, and using
the threshold policy above, the number of transmissions that
occur over the horizon K is ⌊K/(t+1)⌋, and the eavesdropper
error covariances are given by Pe,k|k = fk(P¯ ), k = 1, . . . ,K .
The probability of this event occurring is (λ(1−λe))⌊K/(t+1)⌋.
Let ωc denote the complement of ω. Then we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k]
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k |ω]×P(ω) +
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k|ω
c]×P(ωc)
>
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k|ω]P(ω)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
tr
(
AkP¯ (Ak)T +
k−1∑
m=0
AmQ(Am)T
)
× (λ(1 − λe))
⌊K/(t+1)⌋
>
1
K
tr(AK P¯ (AK)T )(λ(1 − λe))K/(t+1)
→∞ as K →∞,
where the last line holds if |σmax(A)|(λ(1−λe))1/2(t+1) > 1,
or equivalently if
λe < 1−
1
λ|σmax(A)|2(t+1)
. (14)
Since |σmax(A)| > 1, the condition (14) will be satisfied for
any λe < 1 when t is sufficiently large. As 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k]
remains bounded for every t ∈ N, the result follows.
In summary, the threshold policy which transmits at time
k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P¯ ), with t large enough that
condition (14) is satisfied, will have the required properties.
Remark III.5. In a similar setup but transmitting mea-
surements and without using feedback acknowledgements,
mechanisms were derived in [14] for making the expected
eavesdropper error covariance unbounded while keeping the
expected estimation error covariance bounded, under the more
restrictive condition that λe < λ. In a different context with
coding over uncertain wiretap channels, it was shown in [13]
that for unstable systems one can keep the estimation error
at the legitimate receiver bounded while the eavesdropper
estimation error becomes unbounded for a sufficiently large
coding block length.
IV. EAVESDROPPER ERROR COVARIANCE UNKNOWN AT
REMOTE ESTIMATOR
In order to construct Pe,k|k at the remote estimator as per
Section III, the process {γe,k} for the eavesdropper’s channel
needs to be known, which in practice may be difficult to
achieve. In this section, we consider the situation where the
remote estimator knows only the probability of successful
eavesdropping λe and not the actual realizations γe,k. Thus
the transmit decisions νk can only depend on Pk−1|k−1
and our beliefs of Pe,k−1|k−1 constructed from knowledge
of previous νk’s. We will first derive the recursion for the
conditional distribution of error covariances at the remote
estimator (i.e. the “belief states” [35]), and then consider the
optimal transmission scheduling problem.
A. Conditional Distribution of Error Covariances at Eaves-
dropper
Define the belief vector
πe,k =


π
(0)
e,k
π
(1)
e,k
.
.
.
π
(K)
e,k

 ,


P
(
Pe,k|k = P¯ |ν0, . . . , νk
)
P
(
Pe,k|k = f(P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)
.
.
.
P
(
Pe,k|k = f
K(P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)


(15)
We note that by our assumption of Pe,0|0 = P¯ , we have
π
(K)
e,k , P
(
Pe,k|k = f
K(P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)
= 0 for k < K .
Denote the set of all possible πe,k’s by Πe ⊆ RK+1.
The vector πe,k represents our beliefs on Pe,k|k given
the transmission decisions ν0, . . . , νk. In order to formulate
the transmission scheduling problem as a partially observed
problem in the next subsection, we first want to derive a
recursive relationship between πe,k+1 and πe,k given the
next transmission decision νk+1. When νk+1 = 0, we
have Pe,k+1|k+1 = f(Pe,k|k) with probability one, and thus
πe,k+1 =
[
0 π
(0)
e,k . . . π
(K−1)
e,k
]T
. When νk+1 = 1,
then Pe,k+1|k+1 = P¯ with probability λe and Pe,k+1|k+1 =
f(Pe,k|k) with probability 1 − λe, and thus πe,k+1 =[
λe (1− λe)π
(0)
e,k . . . (1 − λe)π
(K−1)
e,k
]T
.
7Hence, defining
Φ(πe, ν)
,


[
0 π
(0)
e . . . π
(K−1)
e
]T
, ν = 0[
λe (1−λe)π
(0)
e . . . (1−λe)π
(K−1)
e
]T
, ν = 1
we obtain the recursive relationship
πe,k+1 = Φ(πe,k, νk+1).
B. Optimal Transmission Scheduling
We again wish to minimize a linear combination of the
expected error covariance at the remote estimator and the
negative of the expected error covariance at the eavesdropper.
Since Pe,k−1|k−1 is not available, the optimization problem
will now be formulated as a partially observed one with νk
dependent on (Pk−1|k−1, πe,k−1). We then have the following
problem (cf. (7)):
min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯ + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
− (1− β)
(
νkλetrP¯ + (1− νkλe)
K∑
i=0
trf i+1(P¯ )π(i)e,k−1
)]
.
(16)
Problem (16) can be solved by using the dynamic program-
ming algorithm for partially observed problems [35]. Let the
functions Jk(·, ·) : S ×Πe → R be defined recursively as:
JK+1(P, πe) = 0
Jk(P, πe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trf(P ))
− (1− β)
(
νλetrP¯ + (1− νλe)
K∑
i=0
trf i+1(P¯ )π(i)e
)
+ νλJk+1
(
P¯ ,Φ(πe, 1)
)
+ ν(1 − λ)Jk+1
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 1)
)
+ (1− ν)Jk+1
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 0)
)}
(17)
for k = K, . . . , 1. Then problem (16) is solved numerically
by computing Jk(Pk−1|k−1, πe,k−1) for k = K,K−1, . . . , 1.
Remark IV.1. In the finite horizon situation, the number of
possible values of (Pk|k, πe,k) is again finite, but now of
cardinality (K+1)×(1+2+ · · ·+2K) = (K+1)(2K+1−1).
This is exponential in K , which may be very large when K
is large. To reduce the complexity, one could consider instead
probability distributions

π
(0)
e,k
π
(1)
e,k
.
.
.
π
(N−1)
e,k
π
(N)
e,k


,


P
(
Pe,k|k = P¯ |ν0, . . . , νk
)
P
(
Pe,k|k = f(P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)
.
.
.
P
(
Pe,k|k = f
N−1(P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)
P
(
Pe,k|k ≥ f
N (P¯ )|ν0, . . . , νk
)


for some N < K , and update the beliefs via:
ΦN (πe, ν)
,


[
0 π
(0)
e . . . π
(N−2)
e π
(N−1)
e +π
(N)
e
]T
, ν = 0[
λe (1− λe)π
(0)
e . . . (1− λe)π
(N−2)
e
(1− λe)(π
(N−1)
e + π
(N)
e )
]T
, ν = 1
Discretizing the space of πe,k to include the cases with up to
N − 1 successive packet drops or non-transmissions, with the
remaining cases grouped into the single component π(N)e,k , will
then give a state space of cardinality (K + 1)(2N+1 − 1).
C. Structural Properties
Denote the difference in the values of Jk(P, πe) when the
minimizing ν∗ are 0 and 1 by
ψk(P, πe) , βλtrf(P )− βλtrP¯
− (1− β)λe
( K∑
i=0
trf i+1(P¯ )π(i)e − trP¯
)
+ Jk+1
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 0)
)
− λJk+1
(
P¯ ,Φ(πe, 1)
)
− (1− λ)Jk+1
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 1)
)
.
(18)
Theorem IV.2. For fixed πe,k−1, the optimal solution to
problem (16) is a threshold policy on Pk−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, πe,k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk−1|k−1 ≤ P ∗
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗ depends on k and πe,k−1.
Proof: Theorem IV.2 will be proved by showing that
for fixed πe, the functions ψk(P, πe) defined by (18) are
increasing functions of P for k = 1, . . . ,K . This will be the
case if we can show that
Jk
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 0)
)
− (1− λ)Jk
(
f(P ),Φ(πe, 1)
)
is an increasing function of P for all k. Using a similar
induction argument as in the proof of Theorem III.3(i), we
can establish the slightly more general statement that
Jk
(
fn(P ), πe
)
− (1− λ)Jk
(
fn(P ), π′e
)
is an increasing function of P for all k, all n ∈ N and all
πe, π
′
e ∈ Πe.
D. Infinite Horizon
In the infinite horizon situation, we note that Theorem
III.4 will still hold, as the threshold policy constructed in the
proof does not require knowledge of the eavesdropper error
covariances.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF SECURITY
We have so far studied security from the viewpoint of trying
to keep the eavesdropper error covariance above a certain level,
which has also been used in other works such as [9]–[12].
However other measures of security are possible (and may be
more appropriate depending on the situation). One alternative
8measure of security is restricting the amount of information
revealed to the eavesdropper, where information is defined
in an information theoretic sense [36]. More specifically, we
want to restrict the sum of conditional mutual informations
(also known as the directed information [37]), revealed to the
eavesdropper. The directed information measure has also been
used in control system design with data rate constraints and
source coding on the feedback path [38], and joint sensor and
controller design for LQG control [39].
Let ze,k , γe,ky¯k = γe,kxˆsk|k be the signal received by the
eavesdropper. The conditional mutual information
Ie,k , I(xk; ze,k|ze,0, . . . , ze,k−1)
between xk and ze,k has the expression (see [36], [39]):
Ie,k =
1
2
log detPe,k|k−1 −
1
2
log detPe,k|k
=
1
2
log det f(Pe,k−1|k−1)−
1
2
log detPe,k|k
(19)
A. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Known at Remote Estima-
tor
We may consider the finite horizon problem:
min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E[βtrPk|k + (1− β)Ie,k]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E[E[βtrPk|k + (1− β)Ie,k
|Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1, νk]]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯ + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
+ (1− β)νkλe
(1
2
log det f(Pe,k−1|k−1)−
1
2
log det P¯
)]
,
(20)
for some β ∈ (0, 1), noting that in the computation of
E[Ie,k|Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1, νk], Pe,k|k = P¯ when νk = 1
and γe,k = 1. The design parameter β in problem (20) now
controls the tradeoff between estimation performance at the
remote estimator and the amount of information revealed to
the eavesdropper, with a larger β placing more importance
on keeping E[Pk|k] small, and a smaller β placing more
importance on keeping E[Ie,k] small.
We have the following structural results:
Theorem V.1. (i) For fixed Pe,k−1|k−1, the optimal solution
to problem (20) is a threshold policy on Pk−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk−1|k−1 ≤ P tk
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P tk ∈ S depends on k and Pe,k−1|k−1.
(ii) For fixed Pk−1|k−1, the optimal solution to problem (20)
is a threshold policy on Pe,k−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pe,k−1|k−1 ≥ P te,k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P te,k ∈ S depends on k and Pk−1|k−1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In order to prove Theorem V.1(ii), we will also need the
following:
Lemma V.2. The function
log det fn(P )− log det fn+1(P )
is an increasing function of P for all n ∈ N.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The infinite horizon counterpart to (20) is:
min
{νk}
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[βtrPk|k + (1− β)Ie,k ]
= min
{νk}
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯+(1−νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
+ (1 − β)νkλe
(1
2
log det f(Pe,k−1|k−1)−
1
2
log det P¯
)]
,
(21)
As in Section III-C, when A is unstable E[Pk|k] can be kept
bounded if and only if λ > 1− 1|σmax(A)|2 . The question now is
whether one needs a similar condition on λe in order to keep
E[Ie,k] bounded, and hence ensure the existence of solutions
with bounded cost to problem (21). The answer turns out to
be “no” (i.e. lim supK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 E[Ie,k] is bounded for all
λe). To show this, for a given K , let the random variable
τ(K) denote the number of times where γe,k = 1 for k ≤ K .
Denote the random times between successful eavesdroppings
by N1, N2, . . . , Nτ(K), with N1 + N2 + · · · + Nτ(K) ≤ K .
Then we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k]
=
1
K
E

τ(K)∑
i=1
(
1
2
log det fNi(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
=
1
K
E

τ(K)∑
i=1
Ni ×
1
Ni
(
1
2
log det fNi(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
<
1
K
E

τ(K)∑
i=1
Ni∆U

 ≤ ∆U
(22)
where the first inequality comes from the following result:
Lemma V.3. Let A be an unstable matrix. Then there exists
a ∆U <∞, dependent only on A,Q, P¯ , such that
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
< ∆U
for all N ∈ N.
Proof: See Appendix C.
As (22) holds for all K , we thus have
lim supK→∞
1
K
∑K
k=1 E[Ie,k] < ∆U <∞.
Theorem III.4 showed that for unstable systems, one could
always find policies which can keep the estimation error
covariance bounded while the eavesdropper covariance became
9unbounded. We might ask whether using the alternative mea-
sure of security of this section, one can also keep the estima-
tion error bounded while driving the information revealed to
the eavesdropper to zero. Theorem V.5 however will show that
the answer is negative: in order to keep the error covariance
of the remote estimator bounded, one will always reveal a
non-zero amount of information to the eavesdropper. Before
proving this fundamental result in Theorem V.5, we will need
the following:
Lemma V.4. Let A be an unstable matrix. Then there exists
a ∆L > 0, dependent only on A,Q, P¯ , such that
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
> ∆L
for all N ∈ N.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem V.5. Let A be an unstable matrix, and assume that
λe > 0. Then, for any transmission policy satisfying
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Pk|k] <∞, (23)
one must have
lim inf
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k] > ǫ
for some ǫ > 0 dependent only on λe, A,Q, P¯ .
Proof: Arguing by contradiction, we first note that for
any transmission policy satisfying (23), the time between any
two successive transmission attempts must be upper bounded
by some constant κmax, where κmax depends on the particular
policy used.
Now fix such a policy satisfying (23). Call a sequence of
transmission decisions ν , {ν0, ν1, . . . } admissible for the
policy if there is a sequence {γ0, γ1, . . . , γe,0, γe,1, . . . } which
generates it. We will show that 1K
∑K
k=1 E[Ie,k|ν] > 0 is lower
bounded away from zero for any admissible sequence ν and
all sufficiently large K , thus proving the theorem.
Fix a K > κmax and an admissible sequence ν. Let K ′
denote the last time over the horizon K when there is a
transmission. Then K−K ′ < κmax, and K ′/K > 1−κmax/K
is bounded away from zero for all K > κmax. We have
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν]
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]× P(γe,K′ = 1)
+
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 0]× P(γe,K′ = 0)
≥
λe
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]
=
λe
K
K′∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]
=
λeK
′
K
1
K ′
K′∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]
> λe
(
1−
κmax
K
) 1
K ′
K′∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]
Now consider the term 1K′
∑K′
k=1 E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]. Within
this time period K ′, there could be a number of instances k
where γe,k = 1. Denote the random times between successful
eavesdroppings by N1, N2, . . . , Nτ(K′), where the random
variable τ(K ′) denotes the total number of successful eaves-
droppings within the time period K ′ (since γe,K′ = 1, we
have τ(K ′) ≥ 1), with N1 +N2 + · · ·+Nτ(K′) = K ′. Then
we have
1
K ′
K′∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν, γe,K′ = 1]
=
1
K ′
E

τ(K′)∑
i=1
(
1
2
log det fNi(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
=
1
K ′
E

τ(K′)∑
i=1
Ni×
1
Ni
(
1
2
log det fNi(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
≥
1
K ′
E

τ(K′)∑
i=1
Ni∆L

 = ∆L
where the inequality comes from Lemma V.4. Hence
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν] > λe
(
1−
κmax
K
)
∆L,
for all K > κmax. In particular,
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[Ie,k|ν] > λe∆L , ǫ
for all sufficiently large K .
We now return to the problem (21). The Bellman equation
for problem (21) is:
ρ+ h(P, Pe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrP¯ + (1− νλ)trf(P ))
+ (1 − β)νλe
(1
2
log det f(Pe)−
1
2
log det P¯
)
+ νλλeh(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)h(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeh(f(P ), P¯ )
+
(
ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν
)
h(f(P ), f(Pe))
}
(24)
where ρ is the optimal average cost per stage and h(., .) is
the differential cost or relative value function [35]. Solutions
h(., .) to the Bellman equation (24) can be found using the
relative value iteration algorithm. Define the functions Vl(·, ·) :
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S × S → R as:
V0(P, Pe) = 0
Vl+1(P, Pe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrP¯ + (1 − νλ)trf(P ))
+ (1− β)νλe
(1
2
log det f(Pe)−
1
2
log det P¯
)
+ νλλeVl(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Vl(P¯ , f(Pe))
+ ν(1− λ)λeVl(f(P ), P¯ )
+
(
ν(1− λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν
)
Vl(f(P ), f(Pe))
}
for l = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Fix an arbitrary (P f , P fe ) ∈ S × S. The
relative value iteration algorithm then computes
hl(P, Pe) , Vl(P, Pe)− Vl(P
f , P fe )
for l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , with hl(P, Pe) → h(P, Pe), ∀(P, Pe) ∈
S × S as l→∞.
Remark V.6. In the infinite horizon case, the number of
possible values of (Pk|k, Pe,k|k) is infinite. Thus in practice the
state space will need to be truncated for numerical solution.
For instance, define the finite set SN ⊆ S by
SN , {P¯ , f(P¯ ), . . . , fN (P¯ )},
which includes the values of all error covariances with up to
N successive packet drops or non-transmissions. Then one can
run the relative value iteration algorithm over the finite state
space SN × SN (of cardinality (N + 1)2)), and compare the
solutions obtained as N increases to determine an appropriate
value for N [40].
We have the following structural results:
Theorem V.7. (i) For fixed Pe,k−1|k−1, the optimal solution
to problem (21) is a threshold policy on Pk−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk−1|k−1 ≤ P ∗
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗ depends on Pe,k−1|k−1.
(ii) For fixed Pk−1|k−1, the optimal solution to problem (21)
is a threshold policy on Pe,k−1|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk−1|k−1, Pe,k−1|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pe,k−1|k−1 ≥ P ∗e
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗e depends on Pk−1|k−1.
Proof: We can verify that the arguments used in the proof
of Theorem V.1 hold when Jk+1(., .) is replaced by Vl(., .),
and hence also holds for hl(., .). The result then follows by
noting that hl(P, Pe)→ h(P, Pe) ∀(P, Pe).
Remark V.8. In contrast to Theorem V.1, for the infinite
horizon the thresholds P ∗ and P ∗e do not depend on the time
index k.
Remark V.9. The motivation for considering in problems
(7) and (16) the mean squared error (or estimation error
covariances) at the eavesdropper rather than the mutual infor-
mation is that since we are considering an estimation problem,
using estimation theoretic measures is perhaps more suitable
than information theoretic measures, which often assume large
block lengths and hence large delays. Nonetheless, the two
notions are closely related, e.g. the expression (19) for the
conditional mutual information is given as the log determinant
of the estimation error covariances. Other relations between
information theory and estimation theory have also been
discovered in the literature, see e.g. [41]–[44].
B. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Unknown at Remote Esti-
mator
In the case where the eavesdropper error covariances are
unknown to the remote estimator, we obtain the problems:
min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯ + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
+(1−β)νkλe
( K∑
i=0
1
2
(log det f i+1(P¯ ))π
(i)
e,k−1−
1
2
log det P¯
)]
,
(25)
min
{νk}
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrP¯ + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk−1|k−1))
+(1−β)νkλe
( K∑
i=0
1
2
(log det f i+1(P¯ ))π
(i)
e,k−1−
1
2
log det P¯
)]
,
(26)
for the finite horizon and infinite horizon situations respec-
tively. Similar techniques as in Section IV can be used to
analyze these problems.
VI. TRANSMISSION OF MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we will briefly describe an extension to the
transmission of measurements, which can also be analyzed
using similar techniques as presented in the preceding sections.
Only the finite horizon situation will be studied here.
In the case where measurements are transmitted, the remote
estimator and eavesdropper will run Kalman filters. At the
remote estimator, we have
xˆk+1|k = Axˆk|k, xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 + γkKk(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)
Pk+1|k = APk|kA
T +Q, Pk|k = Pk|k−1 − γkKkCPk|k−1
where Kk , Pk|k−1CT (CPk|k−1CT + R)−1. We can thus
write:
xˆk+1|k=
{
Axˆk|k−1 , νkγk = 0
Axˆk|k−1+AKk(yk−Cxˆk|k−1) , νkγk = 1
Pk+1|k=
{
f(Pk|k−1) , νkγk = 0
g(Pk|k−1) , νkγk = 1,
(27)
where f(X) , AXAT +Q as before, and
g(X) , AXAT −AXCT (CXCT +R)−1CXAT +Q,
From Kalman filtering theory, we have that g(P ) is an
increasing function of P in the sense of Definition III.1. Note
that in (27) the recursions are given in terms of xˆk+1|k and
Pk+1|k (rather than xˆk|k and Pk|k), which are slightly more
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convenient to work with. Similarly, at the eavesdropper we
have
xˆe,k+1|k=
{
Axˆe,k|k−1 , νkγe,k = 0
Axˆe,k|k−1+AKe,k(yk−Cxˆe,k|k−1) , νkγe,k = 1
Pe,k+1|k=
{
f(Pe,k|k−1) , νkγe,k = 0
g(Pe,k|k−1) , νkγe,k = 1,
where Ke,k , Pe,k|k−1CT (CPe,k|k−1CT +R)−1.
A. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Known at Remote Estima-
tor
In the case where the error covariance of the eavesdropper is
available at the remote estimator, we may consider the problem
(cf. (7)):
min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E[βtrPk+1|k − (1− β)trPe,k+1|k]
= min
{νk}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β
(
νkλtrg(Pk|k−1) + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk|k−1)
)
− (1 − β)
(
νkλetrg(Pe,k|k−1) + (1 − νkλe)trf(Pe,k|k−1)
)]
,
(28)
where the transmission decisions νk are dependent on Pk|k−1
and Pe,k|k−1. For scalar systems, we have the following
structural results:
Theorem VI.1. Suppose the system is scalar.
(i) For fixed Pe,k|k−1, the optimal solution to problem (28) is
a threshold policy on Pk|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk|k−1, Pe,k|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk|k−1 ≤ P ∗k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗k ∈ R depends on k and Pe,k|k−1.
(ii) For fixed Pk|k−1, the optimal solution to problem (28) is
a threshold policy on Pe,k|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk|k−1, Pe,k|k−1) =
{
0 , if Pe,k|k−1 ≥ P ∗e,k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗e,k ∈ R depends on k and Pk|k−1.
Proof: See Appendix E
Example VI.2. The following is a counterexample to show
that for vector systems, Theorem VI.1(i) in general does not
hold. Similar counterexamples to Theorem VI.1(ii) can also
be constructed for vector systems, but for brevity will not be
presented here.
Consider a system with parameters
A =
[
1.2 0.2
0.3 0.8
]
, C =
[
1 −0.5
]
,
Q = I , R = 1, λ = 0.6, λe = 0.6. We have
P¯+ =
[
6.2117 4.7680
4.7680 5.9176
]
.
Consider the transmission decision at the final time instant
k = K . Let
P1 = P¯
+, P2 =
[
6.4 4.5
4.5 6.3
]
, Pe = f(P¯
+).
The final stage costs of problem (28) are:
β
(
νKλtrg(PK|K−1) + (1− νKλ)trf(PK|K−1)
)
− (1− β)
(
νKλetrg(Pe,K|K−1) + (1− νKλe)trf(Pe,K|K−1)
)
For β = 0.73, PK|K−1 = P1, and Pe,K|K−1 = Pe, the final
stage costs when νK = 0 and νK = 1 are 5.4979 and 5.4427
respectively, and thus it is optimal to transmit at time K . On
the other hand, for PK|K−1 = P2 and Pe,K|K−1 = Pe, the
final stage costs when νK = 0 and νK = 1 are 5.7103 and
5.9216 respectively, and thus it is now optimal to not transmit
at time K . But since P2 > P1 (as one can easily verify), this
shows that Theorem VI.1(i) in general does not hold for vector
systems.
B. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Unknown at Remote Esti-
mator
Let us define
F0k (P ) , g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g ◦ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
(P )
F1k (P ) , g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g ◦ f(P )
F2k (P ) , g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ f ◦ g(P )
.
.
.
F2
k−1
k (P ) , f ◦ f ◦ · · · ◦ f ◦ f(P )
where ◦ denotes composition, and the ordering of the g’s
and f ’s in F ik is determined by the binary representation of
i and the correspondence g → 0, f → 1. Assuming that
the initial covariances P0|0 = P¯ and Pe,0|0 = P¯ , then the
possible values that Pk+1|k can take will lie in the finite set
{F0k(P¯
+),F1k (P¯
+), . . . ,F2
k−1
k (P¯
+)}.
Now define the belief vector (c.f. (15))
πe,k=


π
(0)
e,k
π
(1)
e,k
.
.
.
π
(2k−1)
e,k

,


P
(
Pe,k+1|k = F
0
k (P¯
+)|ν0, . . . , νk
)
P
(
Pe,k+1|k = F
1
k (P¯
+)|ν0, . . . , νk
)
.
.
.
P
(
Pe,k+1|k = F
2k−1
k (P¯
+)|ν0, . . . , νk
)


We can easily verify that the following recursive relationship
for the beliefs holds:
πe,k+1 = Φk(πe,k, νk+1),
where Φk(πe, ν) : R2
k
× {0, 1} → R2
k+1 is given by
Φk(πe, ν)
,


[
0 . . . 0 π
(0)
e . . . π
(2k−1)
e
]T
, if ν = 0[
λeπ
(0)
e . . . λeπ
(2k−1)
e (1− λe)π
(0)
e
. . . (1− λe)π
(2k−1)
e
]T
, if ν = 1
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The transmission scheduling problem is then given by
min
νk∈{0,1}
K∑
k=1
E
[
β(νkλtrg(Pk|k−1)) + (1− νkλ)trf(Pk|k−1))
− (1− β)
(
νkλe
2k−1−1∑
i=0
g(F ik−1(P¯
+))π
(i)
e,k−1
+ (1 − νkλe)
2k−1−1∑
i=0
f(F ik−1(P¯
+))π
(i)
e,k−1
)]
,
(29)
where the transmission decisions νk are dependent on Pk|k−1
and πe,k−1. Similar to Theorem IV.2, we have the following
structural result:
Theorem VI.3. Suppose the system is scalar. Then for fixed
πe,k−1, the optimal solution to problem (29) is a threshold
policy on Pk|k−1 of the form
ν∗k(Pk|k−1, πe,k−1) =
{
0 , if Pk|k−1 ≤ P ∗k
1 , otherwise
where the threshold P ∗k ∈ R depends on k and πe,k−1.
VII. NUMERICAL STUDIES
We consider an example with parameters
A =
[
1.2 0.2
0.3 0.8
]
, C =
[
1 1
]
, Q = I, R = 1
The steady state error covariance P¯ is easily computed as
P¯ =
[
1.3411 −0.8244
−0.8244 1.0919
]
.
A. Finite Horizon
We will here solve the finite horizon problem with K = 10.
The packet reception probability is chosen to be λ = 0.6,
and the eavesdropping probability λe = 0.6. Assuming that
the eavesdropper error covariance is available, and using the
design parameter β = 0.7, Fig. 2 plots ν∗k for different values
of Pk−1|k−1 = fn(P¯ ) and Pe,k−1|k−1 = fne(P¯ ), at the time
step k = 4. Fig. 3 plots ν∗k at the time step k = 6. We observe
a threshold behaviour in both Pk−1|k−1 and Pe,k−1|k−1, with
the thresholds also dependent on the time k, in agreement with
Theorem III.3.
Next, we consider the performance as β is varied, both when
the eavesdropper error covariance is known and unknown.
Fig. 4 plots the trace of the expected error covariance at
the estimator trE[Pk|k] vs. the trace of the expected error
covariance at the eavesdropper trE[Pe,k|k ]. Each point is
obtained by averaging over 100000 Monte Carlo runs. We see
that by varying β we obtain a tradeoff between trE[Pk|k] and
trE[Pe,k|k], with the tradeoff being better when the eavesdrop-
per error covariance is known.
Fig. 5 plots the trace of the expected error covariance
trE[Pk|k] vs. the expected information E[Ie,k] revealed to the
eavesdropper, where Ie,k is given by (19). For comparison,
the performance obtained by solving problems (20) and (25)
in Section V is also plotted in Fig. 4. We observe that the
n
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6
7
8
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νk
*
=1
Fig. 2. ν∗
k
for different values of Pk−1|k−1 = fn(P¯ ) and Pe,k−1|k−1 =
fne (P¯ ), at time k = 4.
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
n
e
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
νk
*
=1
Fig. 3. ν∗
k
for different values of Pk−1|k−1 = fn(P¯ ) and Pe,k−1|k−1 =
fne (P¯ ), at time k = 6.
tr E[Pk|k]
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tr 
E[
P e
,k
|k]
0
5
10
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25
30
35
40
45
50
eavesdropper covariance known
eavesdropper covariance unknown
eavesdropper covariance known, Sec V
eavesdropper covariance unknown, Sec V
Fig. 4. Expected error covariance at estimator vs expected error covariance
at eavesdropper. Finite horizon.
solutions to problems (20) and (25) give worse performance
in terms of the tradeoff between trE[Pk|k] and trE[Pe,k|k], but
better performance in terms of the tradeoff between trE[Pk|k]
and E[Ie,k], since they directly optimize this tradeoff.
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tr E[Pk|k]
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
E[
I e,
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eavesdropper covariance unknown
eavesdropper covariance known, Sec V
eavesdropper covariance unknown, Sec V
Fig. 5. Expected error covariance at estimator vs expected information
revealed to eavesdropper. Finite horizon.
TABLE I
EXPECTED ERROR COVARIANCE AT ESTIMATOR VS EXPECTED ERROR
COVARIANCE AT EAVESDROPPER. INFINITE HORIZON.
λ = 0.6, λe = 0.6 λ = 0.6, λe = 0.8
t trE[Pk|k] trE[Pe,k|k] trE[Pk|k] trE[Pe,k|k]
1 5.59 19.49 5.32 4.66
2 7.53 523.06 7.60 14.05
3 10.76 2.82× 105 10.67 136.06
4 15.36 1.21× 108 15.59 2.14× 103
5 23.57 1.19× 1010 23.34 1.72× 105
6 35.07 3.68× 1013 35.04 6.83× 106
B. Infinite Horizon
We next present results for the infinite horizon situation.
Table I tabulates some values of trE[Pk|k] and trE[Pe,k|k],
obtained by taking the time average of a Monte Carlo run
of length 1000000, using the threshold policy in the proof
of Theorem III.4 which transmits at time k if and only if
Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f
t(P¯ ). In the case λ = 0.6, λe = 0.6, condition
(14) for unboundedness of the expected eavesdropper covari-
ance is satisfied when t ≥ 2, and in the case λ = 0.6, λe = 0.8
(where the eavesdropping probability is higher than the packet
reception probability), condition (14) is satisfied for t ≥ 3.
We see that in both cases, by using a sufficiently large t, one
can make the expected error covariance of the eavesdropper
very large, while keeping the expected error covariance at the
estimator bounded.
Finally, we consider the performance obtained by solving
the infinite horizon problems (21) and (26) as β is varied,
both when the eavesdropper error covariance is known and
unknown. We use λ = 0.6, λe = 0.6. In numerical solutions
we use the truncated set SN from Remark V.6 with N = 10.
Fig. 6 plots the trace of the expected error covariance trE[Pk|k]
vs. the expected information E[Ie,k] revealed to the eavesdrop-
per, with trE[Pk|k] and E[Ie,k] obtained by taking the time
average of a Monte Carlo run of length 1000000. We again
obtain a tradeoff between trE[Pk|k] and E[Ie,k]. However, here
the expected information revealed to the eavesdropper always
appears to be bounded away from zero, which is in agreement
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
tr E[Pk|k]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
E[
I e,
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eavesdropper covariance known
eavesdropper covariance unknown
Fig. 6. Expected error covariance at estimator vs expected information
revealed to eavesdropper. Infinite horizon.
with Theorem V.5.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the scheduling of sensor
transmissions for remote state estimation, where each trans-
mission can be overheard by an eavesdropper with a certain
probability. The scheduling is done by solving an optimization
problem that minimizes a combination of the expected error
covariance at the remote estimator and the negative of the
expected error covariance at the eavesdropper. We have derived
structural results on the optimal transmission scheduling which
show a thresholding behaviour in the optimal policies. In the
infinite horizon situation, we have shown that with unstable
systems one can keep the expected estimation error covariance
bounded while the expected eavesdropper error covariance
becomes unbounded. An alternative measure of security has
been considered, where in the infinite horizon situation with
unstable systems, we have shown that the expected amount
of information revealed to the eavesdropper is always lower
bounded away from zero, for any transmission policy which
keeps the expected estimation error covariance bounded. Ex-
tensions to the basic framework have been considered, such
as the transmission of measurements, with an extension to
Markovian packet drops currently under investigation. Future
work will include the investigation of other techniques inspired
by those introduced into physical layer security [7].
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem V.1
Define Jk(·, ·) : S × S → R by:
JK+1(P, Pe) = 0
Jk(P, Pe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrP¯ + (1 − νλ)trf(P ))
+ (1− β)νλe
(1
2
log det f(Pe)−
1
2
log det P¯
)
+ νλλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ ) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
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+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), P¯ )
+
(
ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν
)
Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
}
for k = K, . . . , 1, and define:
φk(P, Pe) , βλtrf(P )− βλtrP¯
− (1− β)λe
(1
2
log det f(Pe)−
1
2
log det P¯
)
+ [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
− λλeJk+1(P¯ , P¯ )− λ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f(Pe))
− (1− λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), P¯ ).
(30)
Part (i) can then be proved using similar techniques as in the
proof of Theorem III.3(i).
The proof of (ii) requires a more delicate argument involving
the use of Lemma V.2. We want to show that for fixed P , the
function φk(P, Pe) defined by (30) is a decreasing function of
Pe. This will be true if we can show that
− (1− β)λe
1
2
log det f(Pe) + [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jk(f(P ), f(Pe))− λ(1 − λe)Jk(P¯ , f(Pe))
is a decreasing function of Pe for all k. Using induction, we
will prove the slightly more general statement that
− (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe) + [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jk(P, f
n(Pe))− λ(1 − λe)Jk(P
′, fn(Pe))
is a decreasing function of Pe for all k, all n ∈ N and all
P, P ′ ∈ S.
The case of k = K + 1 is clear. Now assume that for
Pe ≥ P
′
e,
− (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe) + [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jl(P, f
n(Pe))− λ(1− λe)Jl(P
′, fn(Pe))
+ (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(P ′e)− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jl(P, f
n(P ′e)) + λ(1− λe)Jl(P
′, fn(P ′e)) ≤ 0
(31)
or equivalently,
− (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(P ′e) + [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jl(P, f
n(P ′e))− λ(1− λe)Jl(P
′, fn(P ′e))
+ (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe)− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jl(P, f
n(Pe)) + λ(1− λe)Jl(P
′, fn(Pe)) ≥ 0
(32)
holds for l = K + 1,K, . . . , k + 1. Then
− (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn(P ′e) + [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jk(P, f
n(P ′e))− λ(1 − λe)Jk(P
′, fn(P ′e))
+ (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe)− [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
× Jk(P, f
n(Pe)) + λ(1 − λe)Jk(P
′, fn(Pe))
≥ −(1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(P ′e) + (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe)
+ min
ν∈{0,1}
{
[1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
{
(1− β)νλe
×
1
2
log det fn+1(P ′e) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(P ′e))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν]Jk+1(f(P ), f
n+1(P ′e))
}
− λ(1 − λe)
{
(1− β)νλe
1
2
log det fn+1(P ′e)
+ νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(P ′e))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν]Jk+1(f(P
′), fn+1(P ′e))
}
− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
{
(1 − β)νλe
1
2
log det fn+1(Pe)
+ νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(Pe))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν]Jk+1(f(P ), f
n+1(Pe))
}
+ λ(1 − λe)
{
(1− β)νλe
1
2
log det fn+1(Pe)
+ νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(Pe))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν]Jk+1(f(P
′), fn+1(Pe))
}}
= min
ν∈{0,1}
{
νλ(1 − λe)
{
[1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
×Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(P ′e))−λ(1−λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(P ′e))
− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(Pe))
+ λ(1 − λe)Jk+1(P¯ , f
n+1(Pe))
− (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(P ′e)
+ (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(Pe)
}
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν]
{
[1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]
×Jk+1(f(P ), f
n+1(P ′e))−λ(1−λe)Jk+1(f(P
′), fn+1(P ′e))
− [1− (1 − λ)(1 − λe)]Jk+1(f(P ), f
n+1(Pe))
+ λ(1 − λe)Jk+1(f(P
′), fn+1(Pe))
− (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(P ′e)
+ (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(Pe)
}}
+(1−β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(P ′e)−(1−β)λe
1
2
log det fn+1(Pe)
− (1− β)λe
1
2
log det fn(P ′e) + (1 − β)λe
1
2
log det fn(Pe)
≥ 0
where the first inequality holds after some cancellation, and
the equality is a rearrangement of the terms. The last inequality
holds (for both cases ν∗ = 0 and ν∗ = 1) by the induction
hypothesis (32) and the fact that (1−β)λe 12 log det fn(Pe)−
(1 − β)λe
1
2 log det f
n+1(Pe) is an increasing function of Pe
by Lemma V.2.
B. Proof of Lemma V.2
It suffices to show that
log detP − log det f(P )
is an increasing function of P , as the property that P ≥
P ′ ⇒ fn(P ) ≥ fn(P ′) then implies that log det fn(P ) −
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log det fn+1(P ) = log det fn(P ) − log det f(fn(P )) is an
increasing function of P . Let S denote the set of all symmetric
positive semi-definite matrices. We will use the characteriza-
tion from pp.108-109 of [45] that a function F : S → R
is matrix monotone increasing (which corresponds to Defini-
tion III.1 when restricted to S) if and only if the gradient
∇F (P ) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ S. We have (see e.g. p.641 of [45])
that ∇ log detP = P−1 (from our assumption that Q > 0,
we have Q, and hence P , being invertible), and by the
chain rule that ∇ log det f(P ) = ∇ log det(APAT + Q) =
AT (APAT +Q)−1A. Then
∇
(
log detP − log det f(P )
)
= P−1 −AT (APAT +Q)−1A
= P−1 − P−1PAT (APP−1PAT +Q)−1APP−1
=
(
P + PATQ−1AP
)−1
≥ 0 ∀P ∈ S,
where the third equality uses the matrix inversion lemma.
C. Proof of Lemma V.3
Given a square matrix X , let σmin(X) and σmax(X) be the
minimum and maximum eigenvalues of X respectively if they
are real valued, and let |σmax(X)| be the spectral radius of X .
Denote the largest singular value of X by smax(X).
We have
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN (P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
=
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
AN P¯ (AN )T +
N−1∑
m=0
AmQ(Am)T
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
<
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
ANσmax(P¯ )I(A
N )T
+
N−1∑
m=0
Amσmax(Q)I(A
m)T
)]
=
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
σmax(P¯ )A
N (AN )T
+
N−1∑
m=0
σmax(Q)A
m(Am)T
)]
We also have
σmax(A
m(Am)T )=s2max((A
m)T )=s2max((A
m))≤s2mmax(A)
where the inequality follows from e.g. p.454 of [46].
Then by Weyl’s Theorem [46, p.239], all eigenvalues of
σmax(P¯ )A
N (AN )T +
∑N−1
m=0 σmax(Q)A
m(Am)T will be less
than
σmax(P¯ )s
2N
max(A) +
N−1∑
m=0
σmax(Q)s
2m
max(A)
= σmax(P¯ )s
2N
max(A) +
σmax(Q)(s
2N
max(A)− 1)
s2max(A)− 1
<
(
σmax(P¯ ) +
σmax(Q)
s2max(A) − 1
)
s2Nmax(A)
Recalling that nx is the dimension of xk , we thus have
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
<
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
σmax(P¯ )A
N (AN )T
+
N−1∑
m=0
σmax(Q)A
m(Am)T
)]
=
1
N
[
1
2
log
∏
i
σi
(
σmax(P¯ )A
N (AN )T
+
N−1∑
m=0
σmax(Q)A
m(Am)T
)]
<
1
N
[
1
2
log
((
σmax(P¯ ) +
σmax(Q)
s2max(A)− 1
)nx
s2Nnxmax (A)
)]
≤
1
2
log
(
σmax(P¯ ) +
σmax(Q)
s2max(A)− 1
)nx
+ nx log smax(A)
, ∆U <∞.
D. Proof of Lemma V.4
The proof is similar to, though slightly more involved than,
the proof of Lemma V.3. We have
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
=
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
AN P¯ (AN )T +
N−1∑
m=0
AmQ(Am)T
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
≥
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
AN P¯ (AN )T +Q
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
≥
1
N
[
1
2
log det
(
σmin(P¯ )A
N (AN )T +Q
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
We also have
σmax(A
N (AN )T ) = s2max((A
N )T )
≥ |σmax((A
N )T )|2 = |σmax(A)|
2N
where the inequality now follows from e.g. p.347
of [46]. By Weyl’s Theorem, the largest eigenvalue
of σmin(P¯ )AN (AN )T + Q will be greater than
σmin(P¯ )|λmax(A)|
2N
, and the remaining eigenvalues of
σmin(P¯ )A
N (AN )T +Q will be greater than σmin(Q). Thus
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
≥
1
N
[
1
2
log
∏
i
σi
(
σmin(P¯ )A
N (AN )T +Q
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
≥
1
N
[
1
2
log
(
σmin(P¯ )|σmax(A)|
2Nσnx−1min (Q)
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
= log(|σmax(A)|) +
1
N
[
1
2
log
(
σmin(P¯ )σ
nx−1
min (Q)
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
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Let N ′ be sufficiently large that
∆1 , log(|σmax(A)|) +
1
N ′
[
1
2
log
(
σmin(P¯ )σ
nx−1
min (Q)
)
−
1
2
log det P¯
]
> 0,
which can be satisfied since |σmax(A)| > 1. Then we have
1
N
(
1
2 log det f
N(P¯ )− 12 log det P¯
)
> ∆1 for all N ≥ N ′.
Next, since fN (P¯ ) ≥ P¯ > 0, ∀N ∈ N, and fN(P¯ ) 6=
P¯ , one can use Theorem 8.4.9 of [47] to conclude that
det fN (P¯ ) > det P¯ , ∀N ∈ N. Letting
∆2 , min
N∈{1,2,...,N ′}
1
N
(
1
2
log det fN(P¯ )−
1
2
log det P¯
)
> 0,
we have 1N
(
1
2 log det f
N(P¯ )− 12 log det P¯
)
> ∆2 for all
N ≤ N ′. Defining ∆L = min(∆1,∆2) then gives the result.
E. Proof of Theorem VI.1
In order to prove Theorem VI.1, the following result from
[31] will also be required:
Lemma A.1 (From [31]). Suppose the system is scalar. Let
F(.) be a function formed by composition (in any order) of
any of the functions f(.), g(.), id(.) where
f(P ) = A2P +Q, g(P ) = A2P +Q−
A2C2P 2
C2P +R
,
and id(.) is the identity function. Then F(f(P )) − F(g(P ))
is an increasing function of P .
(i) Define the functions Jk(·, ·) : R× R→ R by:
JK+1(P, Pe) = 0
Jk(P, Pe) = min
ν∈{0,1}
{
β(νλtrg(P ) + (1− νλ)trf(P ))
− (1 − β)(νλetrg(Pe) + (1 − νλe)trf(Pe))
+ νλλeJk+1(g(P ), g(Pe)) + νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(g(P ), f(Pe))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), g(Pe))
+
(
ν(1− λ)(1 − λe) + 1− ν
)
Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
}
(33)
for k = K, . . . , 1. Then problem (28) is solved by computing
Jk(Pk|k−1, Pe,k|k−1) for k = K,K − 1, . . . , 1. For scalar
systems, define:
φk(P, Pe)
, βλf(P ) − βλg(P )− (1− β)λef(Pe) + (1 − β)λeg(Pe)
+ [1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]Jk+1(f(P ), f(Pe))
− λλeJk+1(g(P ), g(Pe))− λ(1− λe)Jk+1(g(P ), f(Pe))
− (1− λ)λeJk+1(f(P ), g(Pe)) (34)
As in the proof of Theorem III.3(i), we wish to show that
for fixed Pe, φk(P, Pe) is an increasing function of P . Since
f(P ) and g(P ) are increasing functions of P , this will be the
case if we can show that
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(Ff(P ), Pe)−λλeJk(Fg(P ), P
′
e)
−λ(1−λe)Jk(Fg(P ), Pe)−(1−λ)λeJk(Ff(P ), P
′
e)
is an increasing function of P for all k, all F(.) formed by
compositions of the functions f(.), g(.), id(.), and all Pe, P ′e ∈
S. The case of k = K + 1 is clear. Now assume that for
P ≥ P ′,
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jl(Ff(P ), Pe)−λλeJl(Fg(P ), P
′
e)
−λ(1−λe)Jl(Fg(P ), Pe)−(1−λ)λeJl(Ff(P ), P
′
e)
−[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jl(Ff(P
′), Pe)+λλeJl(Fg(P
′), P ′e)
+λ(1−λe)Jl(Fg(P
′), Pe)+(1−λ)λeJl(Ff(P
′), P ′e)
≥ 0
(35)
holds for l = K + 1,K, . . . , k + 1. Then
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(Ff(P ), Pe)−λλeJk(Fg(P ), P
′
e)
−λ(1−λe)Jk(Fg(P ), Pe)−(1−λ)λeJk(Ff(P ), P
′
e)
−[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(Ff(P
′), Pe)+λλeJk(Fg(P
′), P ′e)
+λ(1−λe)Jk(Fg(P
′), Pe)+(1−λ)λeJk(Ff(P
′), P ′e)
≥ min
ν∈{0,1}
{
[1− (1− λ)(1 − λe)]
{
β[νλgFf(P )
+ (1 − νλ)fFf(P )]− (1− β)[νλeg(Pe) + (1 − νλe)f(Pe)]
+ νλλeJk+1(gFf(P ), g(Pe))
+ νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(gFf(P ), f(Pe))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(fFf(P ), g(Pe))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(fFf(P ), f(Pe))
}
.
.
.
+ (1− λ)λe
{
β[νλgFf(P ′) + (1− νλ)fFf(P ′)]
− (1 − β)[νλeg(P
′
e) + (1− νλe)f(P
′
e)]
+ νλλeJk+1(gFf(P
′), g(P ′e))
+ νλ(1 − λe)Jk+1(gFf(P
′), f(P ′e))
+ ν(1 − λ)λeJk+1(fFf(P
′), g(P ′e))
+ [ν(1 − λ)(1 − λe) + (1− ν)]Jk+1(fFf(P
′), f(P ′e))
}}
Since fF(.) and gF(.) are also compositions of functions
of the form f(.), g(.), id(.), Lemma A.1 and the induction hy-
pothesis (35) can be used to conclude, after some calculations,
that the above is positive.
(ii) We now wish to show that
[1−(1−λ)(1−λe)]Jk(P,Ff(Pe))−λλeJk(P
′,Fg(Pe))
−λ(1−λe)Jk(P
′,Ff(Pe))−(1−λ)λeJk(P,Fg(Pe))
is an decreasing function of Pe for all k, all F(.) formed by
compositions of the functions f(.), g(.), id(.), and all P, P ′ ∈
S. The proof is similar to part (i).
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